INTRODUCTION

The revitalization of religion, through all the segments of its appearance — growth, intensification, and presence on the public stage (Gavrilović 2009, 27), is largely documented in the analysis of the reality of the contemporary Serbian society. However, that which seems not studied enough within sociological analyses is what religion does in the Serbian society, what its functions are, whether they are manifest or latent, and what they can tell us about the social moment in Serbia.

The initial question in this text is whether religion is used as a source of social capital in the contemporary Serbian society, and if so, what forms this social capital takes. This function of religion in the modern Serbian society has not been the subject of analysis in sociological literature until now. If religious integration is observed as a traditional form of social integration, a question is raised whether old forms of social capital are activated as a response to "social failure", a great number of transitional losers, and weakness of social institutions. Social capital embodied in traditional networks of cooperation represents a substitute for state institutions which are weak (or do not function). On the other hand, a question is posed about the role of religion in the development of “moral density” of the civil society and whether it is possible to use religion in Serbia as this type of social capital. Analyses which connect these two phenomena point out that religion may indeed have the function of securing the integration of the modern society by developing the necessary humane character of the civil society, and teaching people to work for the general good. The Serbian society is multi-religious, and social capital functions within the confessions present in it. One should have in mind that the range of the use of religion as a source of social capital depends on the social teaching$^1$ of each of the present religious orientations. In such conditions, the use of religion for raising “collective awareness” of the social community can be limited to particular confessions and their internal cohesion.

$^1$ Prepared as a part of the project Sustainability of the Identity of Serbs and National Minorities in the Border Municipalities of Eastern and Southeastern Serbia (179013), conducted at the University of Niš – Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, and supported by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

$^1$ Thus, for example in Orthodoxy, which is the dominant confession on the territory of Serbia, social teaching either lacks or is significantly less developed (see: Đorđević & Jovanović 2010), and that is reflected on the ability of the Orthodox to "generate" social capital.
Another important fact can contribute to better understanding of religion as a source of social capital in Serbia. Research shows that religious organizations, especially the Serbian Orthodox Church, are institutions which enjoy the highest level of trust from the citizens. Thereat, Serbia is also trying to build a civil, secular society with a specific status of the SOC as traditional and informally most dominant. Terms such as networks, trust, norms, strategies will be used in this text with the aim of hinting at what type of networking and trust the revitalization of religion in Serbia contributes to. It is a question of whether there are conditions for building a modern, democratic society in its new relevance on the social stage, or if this appearance, in fact, fosters retraditionalization.

The data analyzed in this text encompass 2008-2011, and comes from the following researches: European Values Study (Serbia 2008), Cultural Practice of Serbian Citizens conducted by the Institute for the Study of Cultural Development, Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia conducted by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies.

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When we talk about the modern society, we must emphasize that the theory of linear modernization based on the well-known model was abandoned in sociology a long time ago. That is why authors such as Jeffrey Alexander speak of neomodernization and modernization II, while Eisenstadt mentions multiple modernization. The founders of the neo-modernization thesis refer to certain characteristics of contemporary modernization flows after the collapse of socialism, some of which are very relevant for the position of religion in modernizing societies.

Tiryakian has summarized neomodernization analysis (NMA) as follows:
1. Modernization is the result of actions by individuals and collectives, not an automatic development of systems;
2. They seek new ways to achieve their goals and fulfil their values; but whether these aims can be accomplished, will depend on their resources;
3. Modernization is not a consensual process, but a competition between modernizers, conservatives and bystanders;
4. Science is a major driving force, but religion and tradition must not be underestimated;
5. The general criterion for the success of modernization is the welfare development of the whole population;
6. Centres of modernization may change and move; and
7. Modernization is not continuous-linear; it has also cycles and regressive crises (Tiryakian 1998, according to Zapf 2003).

In such conditions, a debate on the relation between traditional and modern elements in social reality is being led, modern social relations are strived for, while traditional ones are mourned after. This debate exists in professional circles, as well as in the public opinion. The discourse which sees the approach to the EU as a threat to the sovereignty of Serbia and national identity occurs often in the Serbian public opinion. Thus, such debates fit into already present debates which characterize modernization and globalization processes as hazardous to traditional forms of life, “the

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2 The 2006 Constitution did not mark the SOC as the only traditional community, enjoying a privileged position, but as sharing that status with six other, also traditional, religious communities.
Serbian way of life”. “The imperative of modernization” echoes around Serbia. Inco-
prehensible by nature, the echo provides opportunities for various interpretations,
while numerous interpreters call for mobilization recommending themselves as the
saviours who will introduce Serbia to the array of modern societies. The tendency to-
wards change represents a permanent obsession of the political elite, with the equ-
ally incessant cry of the people for “the old rights”. The discord between the impetus
of the modernizers and the desire of the people only amplifies the tendencies of the
conflicted parties, further opening up the gap which appears due to mutually disa-
ppointed expectations, after short periods of enthusiasm and euphoria (Vuletić).

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Religion is considered an important source of social capital. Research and
analyses which treat religion as a source and factor of social capital are generally
based on the Putnam’s tradition in dealing with social capital.

Recently, there has been an increase in the number of researches on social
capital in Serbia. Two concepts of defining and interpreting the concept of social ca-
pital have crystallized in the theory. Both approaches belong to the holistic under-
standing of social capital. According to Bourdieu, social capital comprises a system
of social relationships and acquaintances which can be converted, in certain circum-
stances, into economic capital (Cvetičanin 2010).

“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mu-
tual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group –
which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned ca-
pital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word
(Bourdieu 2002, 286).”

Fukuyama, Coleman, and Putnam (normativists)3 represent the other domi-
nant theoretical direction which determines social capital as interiorized social net-
works, norms, and trust that allow for a spontaneous reliability in the society. Mem-
bers of a social group interiorize rules and customs, therefore, gaining mutual trust
in other members believing that they will respect the same rules of behaviour, which
is the essence of the functioning of social capital (Fukuyama 1997, 19, 35). Putnam
determines social capital as a force which helps members of a community to achieve
collective goals by working together.

“Social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the no-
rms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arises from them (Putnam 2000, 19).”

In his book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-
nity from 2000, Putnam talks about the decrease in the level of social capital in the
US that causes loneliness and alienation. In his later works (Better Together: Resto-
ring the American Community, with Lewis M. Feldstein, 2003), he discovers that
the force needed to bring back the “moral density” to the modern American society
lies precisely in the role of religion. Putnam considers religion as a very important
source of social capital.

3 A complex analysis of all these concepts and their points of convergence and divergence would take too
much space, therefore, it is presented here in a completely simplified manner.
"Putnam (...) himself has recognized that faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America (Smidt 2003, 2)."

The relation between social capital and religion is highly complex. Religion can be treated as a segment of integration of the civil society, as one of the actors and organizations, yet it can also be considered as a “traditional way” of social connection when it acts at the level of state and politics.

"Some, like Putnam, argue that the social capital so essential to democratic life and politics is eroding in the United States due in part to the decline in membership in voluntary associations of all sorts. Others argue that the form of our associations in neighbourhoods, communities, and other contexts is changing to adapt to new social realities. Consequently, the forms of social capital and how they are acquired and used are also changing (Mirola 2006, 141)."

It is hard to discern when one or the other function of religion is in action based only on the analysis of indicators. Following Casanova’s analyses of deprivatized religion, Croatian sociologist Zrinščak poses a question concerning the possibility of reconciling functional differentiation of modern society and deprivatized religion (Zrinščak 2005, 82). He concludes that the action of religion compatible with the functional differentiation as a modern structural trend is possible at the level of the civil society. Other authors also share such Casanova’s propositions in their texts where they analyze the role of religion as a source of social capital.

"Religion is an important source of social capital in many modern societies. Religion as a body of beliefs, values and norms motivates believers to volunteer in community affairs to provide social services such as health care, soup kitchens, education, and helping the poor. Religion also provides a source of common identity to its followers and creates bonds between them. Obviously, religion is only one source of social capital or civic engagement, albeit an important one (Ugur 2007, 154–5)."

In this case, religion is recognized as one form which acts among other forms of organization and encourages solidarity in the modern civil society. Furthermore, the importance of religion for social capital in cities is also emphasized.

"Religion fosters community in a variety of other ways. Soup kitchens, clothing closets, mission projects are religious activities in support of community. Religious institutions also create and sustain local community development corporations, job training, youth programs, and daycare. In Greater Indianapolis there are countless connections between faith and community. Clearly, religion is an important source of social capital in this city (Bodenhamer, 1996)."

Thus, religious organizations encourage volunteering for the general good on the one hand, while instigating altruism through socialization on the other. In his analyses, Putnam has Protestant communities in the US primarily in mind.

Norris and Inglehart analyze the connection between religiosity and social capital in an array of modern societies by analyzing data from the European Values Study. The general impression gained after the insight into the data and the analysis itself is that it is very hard to observe “a regularity in observed irregularities” (Inglehart & Norris 2007). The regularities determined in the analyses show that there is a correlation between attending religious service and volunteering for charity acti-
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The positive correlation is observed in Protestants, Hindus, and Judaists, while the negative correlation is noticed only in Orthodox believers. Norris and Inglehart conclude that belonging to religious organizations goes hand in hand with the engagement in community and democratic participation.

Serbia is very specific when it comes to the presence and functioning of religion. If one says that it is the case of a postsocialist society of "instructed atheism", Eastern European, mainly Orthodox society, one still does not have all of the relevant data needed to enable a complex analysis of the "religious situation". Some of the data which follows can contribute to producing a clearer picture.

The data obtained from our research shows that there are 86.7% of Orthodox examinees in the sample. The second largest group consists of Catholics (4.5%), then Muslims (3.1%), and atheists (1.9%). This distribution is mostly in line with the representation in general population.

Despite the high confessional identification (86.7% of examinees declare themselves as Orthodox against 2% of atheists), only 62.1% of examinees declare themselves as religious, while only 18.1% regularly visits religious buildings for prayers and rites. The analysis of data obtained from the World Values Survey (2002, 2005) and European Values Study (2008) research shows that this number of those people who declare themselves as belonging to any confession is stable and that it does not represent the current mood among the believers. All of these results confirm the findings of Blagojević (2009) and Zrinščak (2008) on the very low percentage of religious participation.

This ratio is much more balanced in Croatia (confessional identification 88.9%, those declared as religious 79.9%, visiting religious buildings for prayers and rites 52.8%), while the situation is somewhat similar to that in Bulgaria (confessional identification 70.0%, those declared as religious 46.7%, visiting religious buildings for prayers and rites 20.2%) (Zrinščak 2008, 33). If similarities and differences are observed, it can be seen that this is the case of postsocialist societies, and the mutual denominator for Bulgaria and Serbia is Orthodoxy.

If we return to the data from our research, we can see that 80% of examinees regularly celebrate religious holidays, while only 8% participates in charity activities of a religious community. Regularly or frequently: 7.5% reads religious literature, 16% fasts, and 17.3% prays.

We could draw a rough conclusion that the presence of traditional religiosity can be clearly seen, even over a small number of indicators, which is characterized by confessional identification connected to ethnic identity and celebration of religious holidays (where Patron Saint's days are also important), as well as more significant days in one's life, such as weddings, infant baptisms or burials of the deceased.

To make the picture complete, the data that only 17.5% of examinees consider religion important in their lives should be added. The family is in the first place, then comes the job, followed by friends and acquaintances, entertainment, and only then by religion, and finally politics.

When we look at the data on self-identification, only 1.3% of examinees choose religious identity as the primary identification marker when other identification options are available, for 6.9% of examinees it is the second most important source of identification, while 9.1% of examinees consider religion as the third most important source of identification (after the first two which they consider more important). This data can be interpreted as an indicator of the relatively rare "use" of
religious orientation as the first source of personal identity in the situation where this type of identification is observed in the context of other identity options. Religious identification is not one of the most important sources of personal identification in Serbia.

The data on the network of friends that our examinees have shows that in 90% of cases the first, second and third friend belong to the same confession. This means that confessions are mostly closed when it comes to making friendships.

Our examinees testify that people ask them for help all the time in 22% of cases, while occasionally in 52% of cases, but these are the people who are members of their religious community in 2.7% of cases, occasionally in 8.2% of cases. Such data is confirmed by the research of the Institute for the Study of Cultural Development and the CECS research. This shows that there is no practice of offering and asking for help when in trouble between members of the same religious group, primarily within the Orthodox community (for which valid conclusions can only be drawn due to the number of examinees). Most frequently it is the friends from their neighbourhoods, neighbours, relatives, and colleagues from work who ask for their help. In the focus group interviews (conducted within the project “Social and Cultural Capital”), examinees also emphasize how they most often turn to their friends and relatives when they have problems. Even though the Orthodox are the most numerous group, when we look at other confessions with the percentage of people asking for help in mind, we can see that Protestants are in front, followed by Muslims.

Only 11.2% of people think that they can rely on three members of their own religious community, 6.7% on two, a 1% on ten. It is also interesting that 30.6% of examinees believe that they cannot rely on any one member of their religious community, while 55% of examinees do not even consider asking someone who belongs to the same religious community for help. The connection in the sense of social networks of members of the Orthodox religious community is not specific for relationships within this group.

Special attention should be paid to the data which shows that only 8% of examinees claim that they participate in charity activities of their religious community. This type of activities is exactly what characterizes the practice of religious communities which function at the level of the civil society. When regular visits to temples for prayers and religious rites are related to charity activities, a certain connection between these parameters can be observed. Namely, with the decrease in the level of visits to religious buildings for prayers and rites, the participation in charity activities also decreases (Pearson Chi Square 1579.245, df 9, Sig .000). These findings confirm the connection that Norris and Inglehart point to. However, when it comes to Serbia, it should be noted that both of these parameters are very low.

Focus group interviews show that examinees do not recognize other people of the same religious orientation as similar to themselves in any case, but that they always take other characteristics into consideration, such as material status (class layer belonging in the narrow sense) or personal traits. One of the cases even showed that someone who at one point started dealing with his or her own religiosity was ostracized from the group of friends!

4 Two of the situations from the focus group interviews conducted within the project “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia” testify to religion (more precisely, to religious fanaticism) being a “reverse resource” of social capital: one of the interviewees in Niš explicitly stated that she would “cooperate with everyone
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Study 2008, where only 3.2% of examinees mentioned that they belonged to a religious community when choosing between various types of organizations, a picture of networks that can be established in Serbia on the basis of religious orientation is quite clear. Thereat, only 21.2% of examinees think that religion helps them solve social problems, while spiritual problems (62%) and moral problems (43.1%) are the ones solved with the aid of religion. Even family problems are not solved from the viewpoint of religion to a great extent – 33.5%. Religion in Serbia (above all among the Orthodox) is rather understood as individual ethics and relationship with the higher power, than as a source of social teaching and legitimization of social behaviour, which is in accordance with the fluid social teaching of the SOC where this world is perceived as only a second-class phenomenon.

It is important to mention that the level of activity within the civil society / civil activism is also very low. Only 2.3% of examinees participate in associations which deal with various forms of social care, 4.4% in cultural activities, 5.7% in unions, 2.1% in local community actions, 1.1% in associations for the protection of human rights. The situation is similar with the participation in associations for environment protection, and women or peace movements. No less than 77% of examinees claim that they do not belong to any group or association. In such conditions, the premise about the connection of belonging to a religious community and some other civil association (Norris & Inglehart 2004) does not hold in the Serbian case.

Neighbourhood is considered to be an important institution for accumulation of social capital. When asked who they would not want in their neighbourhoods, the examinees from Serbia single out criminals, alcoholics, drug addicts, mental patients, HIV-positive people, while confession does not belong to the most important markers. Even when it is the case of Muslims (having recent conflicts in mind), or Judaists (occasional anti-Semitic messages), they do not occupy a high position on the list of unwanted neighbours.

What should definitely be taken into consideration when studying social capital within religious groups is the structure of the authority inside the religious organization. John A. Coleman says the following on that matter:

"A crucial distinction to explain variance in religiosity and the generation of social capital lies in a differentiation between horizontal and vertical relations of religious authority. For example, some forms of religiosity, such as traditional Catholicism in Italy, remain intensely hierarchical in structure. They foster vertical relations (between bishops and priests and priests and people) of passivity and subordination. (...) Only horizontal authority structures, generally, seem to generate social capital (Coleman 2003, 36–7)."

The relations between different level clergy, as well as between clergy and laity in the Serbian Orthodox Church are mostly those of subordination, where an exaggerated condescension is noticeable in religious people when it comes to "church matters". In that sense, there is no basis for creating social capital in the structure of the authority within the church.

Trust is one of the most important parameters of social capital, yet only 11.6% of examinees think that the majority of people in Serbia deserve their trust, except a fascist and religious fanatic", while one of the interviewees in Novi Sad told how he "lost a friend who suddenly became all religious fanatic", broke all his earlier friendships, and "was impossible to normally talk to anymore". 
while 86.2% of examinees believe that in Serbia one should “have eyes in the back of one’s head”. Such a low level of trust in other people is probably an indicator that religion does not enhance the feeling of altruism, bonding, and “moral density” in Serbia.

The data from the analyzed research implies a very limited use of religion as a source of social capital in Serbia. Our sample, guided by the structure of general population, offers the most comprehensive picture of Orthodox believers. Some other analysis, with its focus only on minor religious communities, would, perhaps, create a different picture of them. Even though religion is very present in various aspects on the social scene in Serbia, we cannot consider its functioning as a significant source of social capital. If we perceive the role of religion in the creation of social capital in Serbia as Bourdieu does, we can conclude that belonging to religious communities is not used as part of life strategies, that is, religion is expected to solve spiritual, and not social problems.

If, on the other hand, the basis of our analysis is Putnam’s concept of social capital embodied in norms, networks, and trust, we can again observe that people in Serbia do not create networks on the basis of belonging to religious organizations, because we do not count on members of the same religious community in difficult situations, neither do they count on us, even though we are limited by confession in our friendships. Focus group interviews in both Niš (dominantly Orthodox environment) and Novi Pazar (dominantly Muslim environment) show that friends are those we turn to in difficult situations. Nevertheless, if we bear in mind that our closest friends belong to our confession, this may implicitly point to the existence of such relationships.

When we talk about Serbia, the first conspicuous impression is that religion at the “level of the civil society”, the aspect present in Western cities, does not support the community. Namely, “Serbian Orthodoxy” does not nurture such forms that are characterized by charity activities and volunteering, and which strengthen the collective awareness of members of a religious community for the general good.

The basic communication within the Orthodox religious community is maintained by visits to Patron Saint’s days and birth, wedding or death rites, which once again points to the “four rite believers”.

The everyday presence of religion in events on the public stage in Serbia belongs to the area of state and politics (Casanova 2008).

WHAT DOES RELIGION DO ON THE PUBLIC STAGE IN SERBIA?

If we take a look at the data on trust of people in institutions in Serbia, we can observe that the SOC occupies a high position on the list of institutions that enjoy the trust of Serbian citizens. The research conducted in July 2010 on the territory of the Western Balkans showed that the military and church were the institutions most trusted in Serbia since 2008, however, the military took over the first place from the church in the last three years. The trust that the military enjoys increased from 63% to 77%, while at the same time the trust in church decreased from 75% to 66%. The church is followed by the police that enjoys the trust of 59.6% examinees in Serbia, while significantly lower numbers of citizens trust the media.
(41.6%), the judiciary (38%), and the government (33%). Such layout of percentages can bring us back to one of the initial questions and the setting of the revitalization of religion and its functions as a reply to the weakness of modern society institutions. Perhaps, the premise of the neomodernists on the well-being of a large number of citizens as an important condition for the success of modernization could find its use in the situation where we deal with an enormous number of transitional losers in Serbia. This high level of trust in the church can be found with almost identical percentages in Catholic countries, Croatia, Poland, Italy. Casanova takes religious tradition as an important determinant into consideration when comparing European states and levels of trust in the church. In Catholics and the Orthodox, the church enjoys a high level of trust, while it is not so in Protestants, as expected. When it comes to Serbia, one must also bear in mind the role of the SOC “in the creation and preservation of ethnic identity”.

The premises about religion as “a spiritual and institutional sanctuary and means of protection of local identity, local ethnos and state... religious foundations of national culture” (Radić 2010, 108) are well-known and often repeated. However, research show that the citizens of Serbia do not treat religious orientation as a basic denominator of their identity (as it can also be seen from the data on self-identification from the research of the Institute for Cultural Development in 2010). It is more a matter of political and church rhetoric. Yet, they believe that such rhetoric will help them gather a large number of followers. Ethnic identity is also not the focus of their self-identification, as well as the identification of the other. It seems that the assessment of such role of religion in Serbia today overestimated both by theorists and politicians. The research on the dominant temporal perspective in Serbs (Kostić & Gavrilović, in print) shows that the dominant temporal orientation is the one towards the hedonistic present, while the orientation towards the past is the least prominent one!

There is a trust in the SOC in the people in Serbia, which can perhaps be considered a result of experiencing this institution as part of the collective memory, a type of symbol, that certainly does not mean that the same level of trust also exists when it comes to the SOC priests (Симић 2005), neither when it comes to the members of one’s own religious community. Our friends are dominantly Orthodox, indeed, but we turn to them because we come from “the same neighbourhood”, and not because we are Orthodox!

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5 See Gallup Balkan Monitor research, pp. 32–3.
6 In response to the question “What is it the first thing that you want to know about someone you have just met?” upon offering sexual, ethnic, religious, racial, professional, genre (music) identification and something else option, examinees in Serbia and Macedonia to the greatest extent decided that the dominant characteristic that tells them what they want to know about someone is the professional identification. Namely, 36.6% of examinees from the Serbian sample first opted for the profession. Then, 24.5% of examinees opted for personal traits under the something else option, while 6.7% opted for the system of values, that is, individual characteristics. Only 6.4% wanted to get the information on ethnic affiliation, 4.4% on religion, 5.6% on what kind of music the person they met listened to, 2.2% on sexual orientation, while race was significant to only 0.9% of examinees from Serbia (Gavrilović 2008, 30).

In response to the question “How important is to you that people know – which people you belong to, if you have children, if you are married, which town you come from, your profession, your religious orientation, whether you are a European or Balkan, what music you listen to, your political orientation?”. For the examinees from Serbia, it was most important that someone knew they were parents, where no less than 68.9% wanted the world to know that they had children and that is what they wanted to send as a signal about themselves, with 58.8% of examinees wanting others to know they were married.
There is a familiar story that has the function of a genealogical explanation and, at the same time, legitimization of the secular character of European democratic societies (Berger introduces the term *Eurosecularity*), whose schematic structure is presented by Casanova:

> "Once upon a time in medieval Europe there was, as is typical of pre-modern societies, a fusion of religion and politics. But this fusion, under the new conditions of religious diversity, extreme sectarianism, and conflict created by the Protestant Reformation led to the nasty, brutish and long-lasting religious wars of the early modern era that left European societies in ruin. The secularization of the state was the felicitous response to this catastrophic experience, which apparently has indelibly marked the collective memory of European societies. The Enlightenment did the rest. Modern Europeans learned to separate religion, politics, and science. Most importantly, they learned to tame the religious passions and to dissipate obscurantist fanaticism by banishing religion to a protected private sphere, while establishing an open, liberal, secular public sphere where freedom of expression and public reason dominate. Those are the favourable secular foundations upon which democracy grows and thrives. As the tragic stories of contemporary violent religious conflicts around the world show, the unfortunate deprivatization of religion and its return to the public sphere will need to be managed carefully if one is to avoid undermining those fragile foundations (Casanova 2008, 16)."

The use of religion for the purpose of legitimizing a political conflict has, unfortunately, been witnessed by all of us, and documented in the research by Ivan Cvetković “Confession in War”, yet the data from newer research, which we have processed, shows that a lot of parameters of religiosity have lost their identification and mobilization potential. It seems that religion is being treated as a “sanctuary for identity and foundation of national culture” only by politicians in their instrumentalization of religion for daily political purposes, or by extreme right-wing, parachurch or, as they are also called, clero-fascist groups, while the citizens of Serbia still rather perceive the SOC and Orthodoxy as having that predominantly symbolic effect, the role of the hoard of collective memory (Danièle Hervieu-Léger), than use religious orientation and religion as a living resource of social capital or part of the living strategy in any possible form.

**INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION**

If we return to Bourdieu who sees the social world as “accumulated history” and precisely because accumulated resources (capitals) in their objectivised and embodied forms show the tendency towards acting as objective forces, not everything is equally possible and impossible in the social world (Cvetičanin 2010). We can rightfully say that religion is a part of that “accumulated” history, while the structure and distribution of various types and sub-types of capital in a given moment in time

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7 Examples for this were the events occurring in relation to the Pride Parade held in October 2010 in Belgrade.

8 It is interesting that Bourdieu’s understanding of capital (in all its forms) is based on Marx’s “labor theory of value”, which is otherwise considered out-dated and inadequate by economists and Marxists themselves. One of the key characteristics of capital is that it can be accumulated and, according to Bourdieu, since capital is nothing more than “accumulated work” in all its aspects, then when it is acquired on the private, that is, exclusive basis, it enables the acquisition of social energy in the form of actual or reified work.
represent, for Bourdieu, an immanent structure of the social world written into the mere reality of that world, determining chances of success of social practices (Bourdieu, *ibid*). After this consideration, we can say that religion in the Orthodox community in Serbia is not used as an important resource of social capital, and that not enough attention is paid to the forms of cultural capital which are objectivised. We hope that “not everything is still equally possible and impossible” in Serbia or, as Giddens would say, that the secularization has not taken too much of a toll to keep the fundamentalist forms of the return of religion on the public stage for a while. We hope that such times have passed, as we find the invitation in our e-mail inboxes to a charity concert of the church choir “Branko” and the dance school “Step” in the Saint Sava’s Centre (next to the Cathedral Church) in Niš, where all of the revenue will go to the poor of Niš. It is not enough for statistics, but it is enough for hope.

**REFERENCES**


